Introduction
On 17 December, Turkey crossed an important threshold in the country's 40-year long road tovvards EU membership when the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. In the weeks leading up to the critical summit in Brussels and despite the EU Commission's October progress report recommending the start of accession talks, there vvere lengthy discussions över the extent to vvhich Turkey qualifıed as a member of the organisation. European policymakers repeatedly debated the country's European identity, its demographic growth, its relative poverty and commitment to democratisation. Hovvever, at the summit itself, it vvas the question of Cyprus that very nearly brought negotiations to a standstill.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government representing Turkey at the summit vvas particularly infuriated at the ' Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots expected that in return for their approval of the plan, the EU vvould release 259 million euros of aid and lift the trade ban. However, in the following months, the Republic of Cyprus, novv an EU member, successfully prevented the release of funds, arguing that this would amount to de facto recognition. The conflict once again took centre stage during the EU's Brussels' Summit in December. The EU pointed out the difficulty of opening accession negotiations with Turkey when the country did not recognize the legitimacy of one of the member states' governments.
2 The problem lay in expanding the Ankara Agreement to the ten nevv members of the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus. This time it was Turkey that balked at signing a trade agreement vvhich could constitute de facto recognition of the Republic of Cyprus government. In the end, Turkey agreed to expand the Ankara Agreement by the date of accession while including the proviso that a trade agreement did not imply recognition.
Thus, the EU summit ended vvith a face saving option for both sides. It also regenerated hopes that a solution vvould be found before the start of accession negotiations vvith Turkey. There is a clear incentive for the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to renegotiate an agreement vvith the Greek Cypriots. A resolution before 3 October vvould eliminate the dilemma of de facto recognition and remove any obstacles to Turkish EU membership. For the Turkish Cypriots, it is a long-avvaited opportunity to end their isolation and resolve the över 40-year conflict.
If Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are committed to a settlement before the fail, it vvill be necessary for them to reconsider the most important obstacle to Greek Cypriot support: the security issue.
Greek Cypriot security concerns
Before addressing particular issues at hand, a fevv vvords of reflection on the concept of security; Firstly, the idea of security has a political dimension inherent in the defınition of threat. The latter is in turn the key to the study of security vvithout vvhich security, a derivative concept, is meaningless.
3 Secondly, given that security (and threat) stems from individual or collective perceptions, and the manner in vvhich tvvo actors interpret a given reality may vary, perceptions of threat vvill likevvise also vary. Thirdly, perceptions that are clear to one side might be inscrutable to the other. As a result one actor may not fully appreciate hovv another can perceive a real threat in a symbolic demand. Therefore, security is very often in the eyes of the beholder and needs to be evaluated accordingly. A further complication is the 'securitization' of issues by political actors to meet their ovvn needs. 4 Through their discourse, issues open to resolution within the arena of politics become existential threats that can only be addressed as security issues and thereby politically nonnegotiable.
While the underlying sense of insecurity overwhelmingly defınes the attitudes of both sides to the issues arising in the negotiations, it is the Greek Cypriot community who çite this as the primary reason for rejecting the Annan Plan. Nevertheless, the strong sense of insecurity prevalent in Greek Cypriot discussions of the Annan Plan is often dismissed by the other side.
In a poll taken on 10-12 May, 51% of Greek Cypriots indicated that they would vote 'yes', (with 34% saying 'no' and 15% undecided) if assurances vvere given on the issue of implementation (Turkey's cooperation) and security. This echoed the concerns of the government's largest coalition partner, AKEL, vvho in an unexpected move, voted against the plan. AKEL noted that they vvere concerned vvith guarantees both on the Plan and outside the Plan for its implementation.
5 Similarly, follovving the negative referendum result, Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos launched an international | information campaign_based on an 11-point memorandum outlining the aspects of Annan V that constitute an obstacle to a solution. Of these, the fırst three revolve around questions of Turkish troops, the right of intervention under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the doubts över implementation.
6
Both the question of Turkish troops and the maintenance of the Treaty of Guarantee vvere the sine qua non security demands of the Turkish Cypriot side. Hovvever, I argue that the security assurances they provide for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are proportionally 5 Yiouli Taki and Ayla Gürel, "Political Situation on Cyprus as of June 2004", PRIO Internal Report. 6 Due to the constraints of space, I choose to focus on these three aspects although the remaining issues can also be interpreted from a Greek Cypriot security perspective. These include the number of Turkish settlers allovved to remain, participation of settlers in the referendum, the permanent residence of Turkish citizens on the island, the violation or suspension of fundamental freedoms and rights, the right of return of refugees, the economic costs of the solution, potential problems in the functionality of the state and finally, the non-participation of Cyprus in the ESDP.
less than the perceived threat they represent for the Greek Cypriot community. Given that these issues vvill resurface in the next round of bargaining, they deserve closer scrutiny.
The more contentious of the tvvo issues is the question of Turkish troops. According to the fifth version of the Annan Plan, both sides vvould reduce their troop levels to 6000. Hovvever, follovving the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot side, 650 troops (ali ranks) may remain in Cyprus even after Turkey's EU accession. 7 This demand vvas a departure from an earlier version of the Annan Plan (Annan III) that foresavv the departure of ali troops follovving Turkey's accession to the EU. 8 The second point on vvhich the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey insisted vvas the continuation of Turkish guarantees and the right to unilateral intervention as prescribed in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Both demands vvere forvvarded to ensure the security of Turkish Cypriots. But can these security assurances actually provide more, or less, security for Turkish Cypriots?
The paradox is illustrated in Robert Jervis' 'security dilemma'. 9 A state's efforts to provide security through increasing, or, in this case, maintaining arms may have the opposite effect of augmenting the threat perceptions of the other side thus actually decreasing the given state's security. Thus, demands for maintaining Turkish troops on the island, symbolic though their numbers may be, 10 of Turkey's 1974 action. Accordingly, in line with Jervis' thinking, the Turkish Cypriot side's insistence on these tvvo guarantees may be self-defeating, particularly if they are interpreted by Greek Cypriots as indicative of hostile intent. More insidiously, Turkish/Turkish Cypriot demands provide the necessary ammunition for Greek Cypriot political actors seeking to 'securitize' the issue, raising the perception of threat and ensuring Greek Cypriot rejection of any proposed settlement.
The third Greek Cypriot concern, implementation, hinges on the success of the international community in providing assurances. As in most aspects of the Cyprus problem, the spectre of the past vveighs heavily on the present on this issue too. The insecurity of both sides, the island's 30-year di vision, and the insularity vvith vvhich the Cyprus problem is discussed makes this issue equally open to securitization.
11 Political actors against the Annan Plan on both sides have argued that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee establishing Cypriot sovereignty vvas imposed by outside povvers, broke dovvn in a threeyear period, and left both sides bitter vvith the international community's response. As a result, there is little faith in the international community's vvillingness to involve itself should a reunification effort end in failure. Thus, Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos, lobbying against Annan V, stated that he vvas not vvilling to take a risk that might lead to a loss of recognition for the Greek Cypriots -demoting their status to that of a community from that of a state -should the plan fail. 12 Hovvever, the UN and EU vvho have a vested interest in the success of the plan vvill closely monitor its implementation. According to Annan V, the UN's peacekeeping operations vvill be committed, not only to providing a secure environment, but also promoting compliance vvith the Agreement. In addition, a monitoring committee chaired by the UN and made up of representatives of the guarantor povvers, the federal government, and the constituent states "By insularity, I refer to the lack of appreciation by both sides of the changing international environment and the consequences this has for the Cyprus problem. 12 This comment vvas brought to my attention by Yiouli Taki.
will ensure the implementation of a Foundation Agreement. 13 In a further effort at addressing Greek Cypriot security concerns, the UN forwarded a draft resolution aimed at strengthening the UN force and imposing an arms embargo to support the demilitarization of the island. Hovvever, the resolution vvas ironically defeated by Russia in line vvith AKEL and Papadopoulos' vvishes. 14 For its part, the EU is acutely avvare of the problems that a divided Cyprus presents the organization. On the policy level, the lack of a settlement constrains any efforts the EU makes tovvards normalizing trade relations vvith the North. As noted earlier, this has stood in the way of releasing 259 million euros in aid promised to the Turkish Cypriots follovving the referendum. The lack of a resolution also has a vvider effect on other key EU projects such as the Common European Security and Defence Policy vvhere Turkey, by denying Cyprus security clearance, prevents cooperation betvveen NATO and the EU on intelligence and security issues. 15 Finally, the failure of the Annan Plan has led to a loss of credibility for both organizations; the UN, vvhich initiated the fıfth round of negotiations based specifically on an understanding that there vvas vvillingness from both sides to fınd a settlement, and the EU, vvhose enlargement philosophy, founded on the idea of spreading peace and prosperity, has, to date, failed in the case of Cyprus.
The road ahead
In the nine months leading to the start of Turkey's accession negotiations, the pressure vvill be on to fınd a solution. Although the incentives are greater for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots are avvare that the pressure is on them to make a serious effort tovvards settlement. Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos, accused of negotiating in 'bad faith' during the last round, needs to improve Cyprus' relations with the EU. The Greek Cypriots are also aware that there is not likely to be a better opportunity for them to pursue their own demands given Turkey's preference for a settlement before expanding the Ankara Agreement to include Cyprus. This being said, Turkey, vvith the backing of the UK, has stated that a trade agreement does not constitute recognition.
For their part, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots need to reevaluate the security guarantees they demand, determining their real value against the cost they incur lending support to existing threat perceptions in the Greek Cypriot community.
Finally, the EU and the UN need to play a constructive role by inereasing awareness of security assurances inherent in EU membership as well as in international law and the principles of the UN Charter. Without a clear framevvork of external security guarantees, no amount of incentives vvill yield a lasting solution.
As it stands today, the Green Line is not simply a barrier betvveen the two communities but a mirror 16 refleeting, on both sides, a sense of insecurity that needs to be overeome through the assurances of the international community and the continued efforts of civil society if a settlement to the Cyprus problem is to be successful.
